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INCENTIVES AND JUSTICE FOR SEQUENCING PROBLEMS
PARIKSHIT DE AND MANIPUSHPAK MITRA
ABSTRACT. We address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem. We
identify the just sequencing rule that serves the agents in the non-increasing order of
their waiting costs and prove that it is a Rawlsian rule. We identify all rVCG mech-
anisms that implement the just sequencing rule. The other properties of the just se-
quencing rule that we identify are the following. It is an affine cost minimizer. It can be
implemented with budget balanced rVCG mechanisms. Finally, when waiting cost and
processing time are private information, we identify all generalized rVCG mechanisms
that ex-post implement the just sequencing rule.
JEL Classifications: C72, D63, D82.
Keywords: sequencing, implementation, outcome efficient sequencing rule, just se-
quencing rule, budget balance, ex-post implementation.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem
where agents have quasi-linear preferences. The setting comprises of a finite set of
agents each of whom has one job to process using one facility. The facility can only
handle one job at a time. No job can be interrupted once it starts processing. Each job
is characterized by processing time and waiting cost. The latter represents the agent’s
disutility for waiting one unit of time. There is a well established literature in this
direction (see Dolan [10], Duives, Heydenreich, Mishra, Muller and Uetz [11], Hain
and Mitra [13], Mitra [25], Moulin [27] and Suijs [33]).
A well-known and well studied concept is the outcome efficient sequencing rule
that minimizes the aggregate job completion cost of the agents. Outcome efficiency,
as pointed out by Smith [32], requires that the jobs of the agents are processed in the
non-increasing order of their urgency index where urgency index of any agent as the
ratio of his waiting cost and his processing time. It is well-known that, as long as
preferences are ‘smoothly connected’ (see Holmstro¨m [15]), outcome efficienct rules
The authors would like to thank Debasis Mishra, Suresh Mutuswami and Arunava Sen for helpful com-
ments and suggestions.
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can be implemented in dominant strategies if and only if the mechanism is a Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (see Clarke [8], Groves [12] and Vickrey [35]). For
the sequencing problem outcome efficiency was analyzed by Dolan [10], Mitra [25]
and Suijs [33].
The main contribution of this paper is to address the implementability issue of the
Rawlsian sequencing rule which is based on John Rawls’ principle of distributive jus-
tice (see Rawls [30]). The Rawlsian sequencing rule first identifies the maximum agent
specific job completion cost for each order of serving and then picks that order which
minimizes this maximum agent specific job completion cost. We show that a sequenc-
ing rule for which agents are served in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs
is a Rawlsian sequencing rule. We refer to this rule as the just sequencing rule and
show that this Rawlsian rule is implementable in dominant strategies. We identify all
‘rVCG mechanisms’ that implements the just sequencing rule.
Our result on implementation of the just sequencing rule shows compatibility of in-
centives and justice. In the mechanism design literature without transfers where pref-
erences of the agents are defined using distance from the bliss points, Chichilnisky
and Heal [3] argued that Rawlsian rules are “locally dictatorial” and hence imple-
mentable. However, in the mechanism design literature with transfers, this compat-
ibility of incentives and justice is indeed rare. Papers by Deb and Mishra [9] and Lavi,
Mu’alem and Nisan, N. [22] show that the Rawlsian allocation is incompatible with
implementability in dominant strategies. To the best of our knowledge, the only other
paper that shows this compatibility between incentives and justice is by Velez [34] for
the (house) allocation problems.1
In the mechanism design literature a classic contribution is due to Roberts [31] who
proved that, with unrestricted domains, if an allocation rule is implementable in dom-
inant strategies, then it must be an ‘affine maximizer’ allocation rule. For the sequenc-
ing problem the correct adoption of Roberts’ affine maximizer allocation rules is the
‘affine cost minimizer sequencing rules’. It is quite easy to verify that the outcome ef-
ficient sequencing rule is an affine cost minimizer. Interestingly, the just sequencing
rule, in spite of being a Rawlsian sequencing rule, is an affine cost minimizer.
Consider the sequencing problem where the processing time of the agents are iden-
tical. Such situations are referred to as the queueing problem. Queueing problems has
been analyzed extensively from both normative and strategic viewpoints (see Chun
[4], Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [5], Hashimoto and Saitoh [14], Kayi and Ramaekars
1Velez [34] showed that the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair solutions implements the no envy solu-
tion in Nash and Strong Nash equilibria.
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[20], Maniquet [23], Mitra [24], Mitra and Mutuswami [29] and Mukherjee [28]). For
the queueing problem, the outcome efficient sequencing rule implies that the rule is
also the just sequencing rule. However, for sequencing problems with non-identical
processing time across agents, outcome efficient sequencing rule is different from the
just sequencing rule and hence such sequencing problems brings out the trade-off be-
tween outcome efficient sequencing rule and the just sequencing rule.
The importance of finding balanced VCG mechanisms to implement outcome effi-
ciency for canonical allocation problems was highlighted by Zhou [37]. However, for
many economic environments implementing outcome efficiency with balanced trans-
fers is not possible (see Hurwicz [16], Hurwicz and Walker [17] and Walker [36]). For
sequencing problem it is possible to get budget balanced (or first best) implementa-
tion with the outcome efficiency (see Mitra[25] and Suijs [33]). We show that we can
also find rVCG mechanisms that implements the just sequencing rule with balanced
transfers and identify the set of all such balanced rVCG mechanisms. Again, for the
queueing problem, the set of all balanced rVCG mechanisms coincide with the set of
all balanced VCG mechanisms.2
The just sequencing rule is independent of the processing time of the agents. There-
fore, if we have a two-dimensional incentive problem, where waiting cost and process-
ing time are private information, ex-post implementability of the just sequencing rule is
possible. If processing times are private information, we have mechanism design prob-
lem under interdependent value, as the processing time generates interdependence
across agents. Hence the correct notion of implementation is ex-post implementation.
Specifically we show that the just sequencing rule is ex-post implementable by making
some minor ‘modification’ in the rVCG mechanisms. Moreover, given the earlier re-
sults on implementability of the just sequencing rule with balanced rVCG mechanisms,
it follows that ex-post implementability with balanced transfers is also a possibility.
Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame [18] proved that the only determinis-
tic social choice functions that are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism de-
sign frameworks with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations are
those rules for which the same alternative is chosen irrespective of agents’ signals,
that is, the outcome should be independent of the interdependent signals. In sequenc-
ing with two-dimensional incentive problem, one dimension is waiting cost which is
the private value and the other dimension is processing time that generates interde-
pendence in terms of cost of completion time. The just sequencing rule is non-trivial
2The literature on balanced VCG mechanisms for the queueing problem includes paper like Chun ,
Mitra and Mutuswami [6], Kayi and Ramaekars [20] and Mitra [24].
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in terms of the waiting cost or private value dimension and is independent of the in-
terdependence inducing processing time (like the independence of the interdependent
signal required by Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame [18] for ex-post im-
plementability) and hence, the just sequencing rule is a non-trivial rule which is ex-
post implementable. Moreover, for the outcome efficient sequencing rule the profile
contingent order is dependent on the processing time and hence it is not ex-post im-
plementable under this two-dimensional incentive problem.3
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we provide the framework
of the sequencing problems. In Section 3, we introduce and analyze the just sequencing
rule. In Section 4 we deal with properties of the just sequencing rule. This is followed
by Section 5 which is the conclusion.
2. THE FRAMEWORK
Consider a finite set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} in need of a facility that can be
used sequentially. Using this facility, the agents want to process their jobs. The job
processing time can be different for different agents. Specifically, for each agent i ∈ N,
the job processing time is given by si > 0. Let R++ be the positive orthant of the real
line R and let θiSi measure the cost of job completion for agent i ∈ N where Si ∈ R++
is the job completion time for this agent and θi ∈ Θ := R++ denotes his constant
per-period waiting cost. Due to the sequential nature of providing the service, the job
completion time Si for agent i depends not only on his own processing time si but
also on the processing time of the agents who precedes him in the order of service. By
means of an orderσ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) on N, one can describe the positions of each agent in
the order. Specifically,σi = k indicates that agent i has the k-th position in the order. Let
Σ(N) be the set of n! possible orders on N. We define Pi(σ) = { j ∈ N \ {i} | σ j < σi}
to be the predecessor set of i in the order σ , that is, set of agents served before agent
i in the order σ . Similarly, P′i (σ) = { j ∈ N \ {i} | σ j > σi} denotes the successor
set of i in the order σ , that is, set of agents served after agent i in the order σ . Let
s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S := Rn++ denote the vector of processing time of the agents. Given
a vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S and an order σ ∈ Σ(N), the cost of job completion for
agent i ∈ N is θiSi(σ), where the job completion time is S j(σ) = ∑ j∈Pi(σ) s j + si. The
agents have quasi-linear utility of the form vi(σ , τi; mi = (θi, si); s−i) = −θiSi(σ) + τi
where σ is the order, τi ∈ R is the transfer that he receives and the parameters of the
3Ex-post implementability literature includes papers by Bergemann and Morris [1], Bikhchandani [2],
Chung and Ely [7], Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu and Zame [18], Jehiel and Moldovanu [19], and,
Karsten, Kittsteiner, and Benny Moldovanu [21]). For the sequencing problem with private information
only in processing time, incentive issues were addressed by Hain and Mitra [13] and Moulin [27].
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model are agents own parameter mi = (θi, si) that constitutes of the waiting costθi and
the processing time si, and, more importantly, the processing time of the other agents
that determines agent i’s job completion time Si(σ). Specifically, given a commonly
known job processing time vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S and an order σ ∈ Σ(N), the
utility of agent i, with just the waiting cost parameter θi, reduces to
vi(σ , τi; mi = (θi, si); s−i) := Ui(σ , τi;θi) = −θiSi(σ) + τi = −θi
si + ∑
j∈Pi(σ)
s j
+ τi.
If we assume that both waiting cost and processing time are private information, then
we have a general sequencing problem for N agents which we denote byΩN = (Θn, S).
In this context we associate the utility function vi(.) for each i ∈ N. If the processing
time vector s ∈ S is given and waiting cost is private information, then we have a
sequencing problem ΩsN = (Θ
n, s) and in that case the utility function reduces to Ui(.)
(from vi(.)) for each i ∈ N. Except for Subsection 4.3, we will deal withΩsN. Hence our
first objective is to design direct revelation mechanisms for any given ΩsN.
For any set X, let |X| denote the cardinality of X. A typical profile of waiting costs
is denoted by θ = (θ1, . . . ,θn) ∈ Θn, and, for any i ∈ N, θ−i ∈ Θ|N\{i}| denotes the
profile (θ1 . . .θi−1,θi+1, . . .θn) which is obtained from the profile θ by eliminating i’s
waiting cost. For a given sequencing problem ΩsN, a (direct revelation) mechanism is
(σ , τ) that constitutes of a sequencing rule σ and a transfer rule τ . A sequencing rule
is a function σ : Θn → Σ(N) that specifies for each profile θ ∈ Θn a unique order
σ(θ) = (σ1(θ), . . . ,σn(θ)) ∈ Σ(N).4 A transfer rule is a function τ : Θn → Rn that
specifies for each profile θ ∈ Θn a transfer vector τ(θ) = (τi(θ), . . . , τn(θ)) ∈ Rn.
Specifically, given any sequencing problem ΩsN and given any mechanism (σ , τ), if
(θ′i ,θ−i) is the announced profile when the true waiting cost of i is θi, then utility of i is
Ui(σ(θ′i ,θ−i), τi(θ
′
i ,θ−i);θi) = −θiSi(σ(θ′i ,θ−i) + τi(θ′i ,θ−i).
Definition 1. A mechanism (σ , τ) implements the sequencing ruleσ in dominant strate-
gies if the transfer rule τ : Θn → Rn is such that for any i ∈ N, any θi,θ′i ∈ Θ and any
θ−i ∈ Θ|N\{i}|,
(1) Ui(σ(θ), τi(θ);θi) ≥ Ui(σ(θ′i ,θ−i), τi(θ′i ,θ−i);θi).
4The sequencing rule is a function and not a correspondence. Hence, we will require tie-breaking rule
to reduce a correspondence to a function which, unless explicitly discussed, will be fixed. We use the
following tie-breaking rule. We fix any linear order  on the set of agents N. For any sequencing rule
σ and any profile θ ∈ Θn with a tie situation between agents i, j ∈ N, we pick the order σ(θ) with
σi(θ) < σ j(θ) if and only if i  j.
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Implementation of a ruleσ via a mechanism (σ , τ) requires that the transfer rule τ is
such that truthful reporting for any agent weakly dominates false reporting irrespec-
tive of other agents’ report.
2.1. The outcome efficient sequencing rule.
Definition 2. A sequencing rule σ∗ is outcome efficient if for any θ ∈ Θn, σ∗(θ) ∈
argminσ∈Σ(N) ∑i∈N θiSi(σ).
For each profile the outcome efficient sequencing rule selects an order to minimiza-
tion the aggregate cost of completion time. Define ui := θi/si as the urgency index of
agent i which is the ratio of his waiting cost and his processing time. From Smith [32]
we know that for any sequencing problemΩsN a sequencing ruleσ
∗ is outcome efficient
if and only if for any profileθ, the selected orderσ∗(θ) satisfies condition (OE): For any
i, j ∈ N, θi/si ≥ θ j/s j ⇔ σ∗i (θ) ≤ σ∗j (θ).5 Therefore, outcome efficient sequencing rule
requires that the agents are ordered in the non-increasing order of their urgency index.
From (OE) it is clear that if θi/si ≥ θ j/s j, then Si(σ∗(θ)) ≤ S j(σ∗(θ)). Consider the
outcome efficient sequencing rule σ∗. It is well-known that VCG mechanisms are the
only mechanisms that implement σ∗ (see Holmstro¨m [15]).
Definition 3. For the outcome efficient sequencing rule σ∗, a mechanism (σ∗, τ) is a
VCG mechanism if the transfer rule is such that for all θ ∈ Θn and all i ∈ N,
(2) τ∗i (θ) =
 hi(θ−i) if P
′
i (σ
∗(θ)) = ∅,
hi(θ−i)− si ∑
j∈P′i (σ∗(θ))
θ j otherwise.
where the function hi : Θ|N\{i}| → R is arbitrary.
Given a sequencing problem ΩsN, for any profile θ ∈ Θn and any i ∈ N and any
j ∈ N \ {i}, let θ jsi be the pivotal cost of agent i on agent j. We call this the pivotal
cost because θ jsi is the incremental cost that agent j has to incur if agent i precedes
agent j in any order. The VCG transfer in condition (2) specifies that for any i ∈ N and
any θ−i ∈ ΘN\{i}, if θi is such that agent i is served last in the outcome efficient order
σ∗(θi,θ−i), that is, if P′i (σ
∗(θi,θ−i)) = ∅, then τ∗i (θi,θ−i) = hi(θ−i). If, however, θ′i is
such that agent i is not served last in the order σ∗(θ′i ,θ−i), that is, if P
′
i (σ
∗(θ′i ,θ−i) 6= ∅,
then agent i’s transfer τ∗i (θ
′
i ,θ−i) not only has hi(θ−i) but he also has to pay the sum of
the pivotal cost that agent i incurs on his followers in the order σ∗(θ′i ,θ−i) (that is, the
waiting cost of all the agent(s) served after him times his own processing time).
5Given the tie-breaking rule, this selection is unique.
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The VCG transfer τ∗i (θ) (in condition (2)) for which the agent specific constant func-
tions hi(.) are always zero for all agents gives us the pivotal mechanism for implement-
ing the outcome efficient orderσ∗. The first work that identified the pivotal mechanism
for any sequencing problem is by Dolan [10]. It must be pointed out that the specifica-
tion (2) of the VCG transfers is the pivotal based representation of the VCG transfers
and is not its standard representation. We show that an appropriate transformation
of the standard VCG transfers gives us (2). The standard way of specifying the VCG
transfers is that for all θ and for all i ∈ N,
(3) τ∗i (θ) = − ∑
j∈N\{i}
S j(σ∗(θ))θ j + gi(θ−i).6
Consider the outcome efficient order σ∗(θ) for the profile θ ∈ Θn and suppose that
agent i leaves. We define the “induced” order σ∗(θ−i) (of length |N \ {i}|) for the
agents in N \ {i} as follows:
(4) σ∗j (θ−i) =
{
σ∗j (θ)− 1 if j ∈ P′i (σ∗(θ)),
σ∗j (θ) if j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θ)).
In words, σ∗(θ−i) is the order formed by removing agent i and moving all agents be-
hind him up by one position. Given the same tie-breaking rule for the economy with
N \ {i} agents, it is easy to see that if σ∗(θ) is outcome efficient for the profile θ, then
σ∗(θ−i) is also outcome efficient in N \ {i} for the profile θ−i. Without loss of general-
ity, we can write for all θ and all i ∈ N, (A) gi(θ−i) = ∑ j∈N\{i} S j(σ∗(θ−i))θ j + hi(θ−i).
By substituting (A) in (3) we get
(5) τ∗i (θ) = − ∑
j∈N\{i}
[S j(σ∗(θ))− S j(σ∗(θ−i))]θ j + hi(θ−i).
If for a profile θ ∈ Θn, the outcome efficient order is σ∗(θ) and agent i leaves, then the
order σ∗(θ−i) is such that if j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θ)), then j’s completion time remains unaltered
and if k ∈ P′i (σ∗(θ)), then k’s completion time reduces by si. Hence
(6) S j(σ∗(θ))− S j(σ∗(θ−i)) =
{
si if j ∈ P′i (σ∗(θ)),
0 if j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θ)).
By substituting condition (6) in the transformed VCG transfer (5) and then simplifying
it we get the VCG transfer (2).7
6See Mitra [25] and Suijs [33].
7A similar argument for the pivotal based representation of VCG transfers (like condition (2)) for the
queueing problem can be found in Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [5].
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3. AN IMPLEMENTABLE RAWLSIAN SEQUENCING RULE
Definition 4. A sequencing rule σ ′ is Rawlsian if for each profile θ ∈ Θn, σ ′(θ) ∈
min
σ∈Σ(N)
max
j∈N
S j(σ)θ j.
Given any profile θ ∈ Θn, for each order σ ∈ Σ(N), let M(σ) = θ jS j(σ) ≥ θkSk(σ)
for all k ∈ N, that is, for the given profileθ and given the orderσ , M(σ) is the maximum
value of the cost of completion time among all agents in N. The Rawlsian sequencing
rule picks that order σ ′ ∈ Σ(N) for which M(σ ′) is minimum, that is M(σ ′) ≤ M(σ)
for all σ ∈ Σ(N).
Example 1. Consider the sequencing problem ΩsN such that N = {1, 2, 3} and s =
(s1 = 1, s2 = 2, s3 = 3). Let the waiting cost vector be θ = (θ1 = 100,θ2 = 5,θ3 = 3).
For θ, outcome efficiency uniquely picks the order σ1 = (σ1 = 1,σ2 = 2,σ3 = 3) since
u1 > u2 > u2. However, the Rawlsian selection is not unique. For profile θ we have
the following: M(σ1 = (σ1 = 1,σ2 = 2,σ3 = 3)) = θ1s1 = 100, M(σ2 = (σ1 = 1,σ2 =
3,σ3 = 2)) = θ1s1 = 100, M(σ3 = (σ1 = 2,σ2 = 1,σ3 = 3)) = θ1(s2 + s1) = 300,
M(σ4 = (σ1 = 2,σ2 = 3,σ3 = 1)) = θ1(s3 + s1) = 400, M(σ5 = (σ1 = 3,σ2 =
1,σ3 = 2)) = θ1(s2 + s3 + s1) = 600, and M(σ6 = (σ1 = 3,σ2 = 2,σ3 = 1)) =
θ1(s3 + s2 + s1) = 600. Therefore, for the profile θ, the Rawlsian rule can either pick
σ1 or σ2 implying that the Rawlsian rule does not guarantee state contingent unique
order selection. Note that the order σ1 also has the property that it serves the agents
in the decreasing (hence non-increasing) order of their waiting cost, that is given θ1 >
θ2 > θ3, agent 1 is served first followed by agent 2 and then by agent 3.
Let the waiting cost vector be θ′ = (θ′1 = 10,θ2 = 5,θ3 = 3). For profile θ′ we
have the following: M(σ1 = (σ1 = 1,σ2 = 2,σ3 = 3)) = θ3(s1 + s2 + s3) = 18,
M(σ2 = (σ1 = 1,σ2 = 3,σ3 = 2)) = θ2(s1 + s3 + s2) = 30, M(σ3 = (σ1 = 2,σ2 =
1,σ3 = 3)) = θ′1(s2 + s1) = 30, M(σ4 = (σ1 = 2,σ2 = 3,σ3 = 1)) = θ′1(s3 + s1) = 40,
M(σ5 = (σ1 = 3,σ2 = 1,σ3 = 2)) = θ′1(s2 + s3 + s1) = 60, and M(σ6 = (σ1 =
3,σ2 = 2,σ3 = 1)) = θ′1(s3 + s2 + s1) = 60. For the profile θ′, M(σ1) < M(σk) for all
k ∈ {2, . . . , 6} and hence any Rawlsian rule uniquely picks σ1.
The above example suggests that we can have profiles θ for which more than one
order is Rawlsian. It also seems likely that serving the agents in the non-increasing
order of their waiting costs is always Rawlsian. In the next theorem we show that this
is indeed the case.
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Definition 5. A sequencing rule σ˜ is just if for each profile θ ∈ Θn, the chosen order
σ˜(θ) satisfies the following property: for any i, j ∈ N such that θi ≥ θ j, σ˜i(θ) ≤ σ˜ j(θ).8
Theorem 1. For any ΩsN, the just sequencing rule σ˜ is Rawlsian.
Proof: To prove that the just sequencing rule σ˜ is Rawlsian, consider any profileθ ∈ Θn
and the just order σ˜(θ). Consider that agent i ∈ N for whom the cost of completion
time θiSi(σ˜(θ)) = θi(∑ j∈Pi(σ˜(θ)) s j + si) is maximum under σ˜(θ), that is M(σ˜(θ)) =
θiSi(σ˜(θ)).9 Define O := Pi(σ˜(θ)) ∪ {i} as the set that includes the set of predecessors
of i under the order σ˜(θ) and that also includes agent i. Observe that from the defini-
tion of just sequencing rule it follows that θ j ≥ θi for all j ∈ O. Consider any other
order σ ∈ Σ(N) \ {σ˜(θ)}. For this order σ , there is one agent in O who will be served
last under σ relative to the other members of O, that is, there exists an agent j ∈ O
such that σ j > σk for all k ∈ O \ { j}. This means that O ⊆ Pj(σ) ∪ { j}, and hence
S j(σ) ≥ Si(σ˜(θ)), that is the completion time of agent j under the order σ is not less
than the completion time of agent i under the order σ˜(θ). Therefore, the maximum
cost of completion time M(σ) under σ is at least as large as the maximum cost of com-
pletion time M(σ˜(θ)) = θiSi(σ˜(θ)) under σ˜(θ) since M(σ) ≥ θ jS j(σ) ≥ θ jSi(σ˜(θ)) ≥
θiSi(σ˜(θ)) = M(σ˜(θ)). Since the selection of σ was arbitrary the result follows. 
Remark 1. Consider any sequencing problem Ωs
∗
N with s
∗ = (s∗1 , . . . , s∗n) ∈ S and
s∗1 = . . . = s∗n so that we have the queueing problem. Then the outcome efficient
sequencing rule implies the just sequencing rule and hence a Rawlsian sequencing
rule. For the queueing problem Ωs
∗
N , for any profile θ ∈ Θn, the order of the urgency
indexes and that of the waiting costs are identical and hence this implication.
Definition 6. For the just sequencing rule σ˜ , a mechanism (σ˜ , τ˜) is an rVCG mechanism
if the transfer rule is such that for all θ ∈ Θn and all i ∈ N,
(7) τ˜i(θ) =
 hi(θ−i) if P
′
i (σ˜(θ)) = ∅,
hi(θ−i)− ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θ))
θ js j otherwise.
where the function hi : Θ|N\{i}| → R is arbitrary.
Given a sequencing problem ΩsN, for any profile θ ∈ Θn and any j ∈ N, let θ js j
be the minimum cost of agent j, that is the cost that agent j would have incurred if
he was served first in any order. Like the VCG transfers (2), the rVCG transfers (7)
8Given the tie-breaking rule, for any profile θ ∈ Θn, this selection σ˜(θ) is unique.
9If there are more than one agent for whom the cost is maximum, pick any one of them arbitrarily.
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specifies that for any i ∈ N and any θ−i ∈ ΘN\{i}, if θi is such that agent i is served
last in the just order σ˜(θi,θ−i), then τ˜i(θi,θ−i) = hi(θ−i). If θ′i is such that agent i is
not served last in the order σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i), then agent i’s transfer τ˜i(θ
′
i ,θ−i) not only has
hi(θ−i) but he also has to pay the sum of the minimum cost of his followers in the just
order σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i). As long as we are in a sequencing problem Ω
s
N where the processing
time of the agents are not identical, there will be some profile θ and some agent j for
whom the minimum cost θ js j will be different from the pivotal cost θ jsi of i on j for
some i ∈ N \ { j}. Hence the payment amounts in the rVCG transfers are qualitatively
different from the payment amounts under the VCG transfers (2) where, recall that,
the payment amount is the sum of the pivotal cost of agent i on all his followers in the
outcome efficient sequencing order. Therefore, it is easy to see that for the queueing
problem Ωs
∗
N we have the following: For any agent j ∈ N, any agent i ∈ N \ {i} and
any profile θ, the minimum cost θ js∗j is identical to the pivotal cost θ js
∗
i since s
∗
i = s
∗
j
and, given the same tie-breaking rule, σ∗(θ) = σ˜(θ). Thus, the VCG-mechanisms and
the rVCG mechanisms are identical for the queueing problem Ωs
∗
N .
Theorem 2. The just sequencing rule σ˜ is implementable if and only if the mechanism
(σ˜ , τ) that implements it is an rVCG mechanism.
Proof: Consider the just sequencing rule σ˜ . We first prove that if a mechanism (σ˜ , τ)
implements σ˜ , then it is necessarily the rVCG mechanism. Consider any agent i ∈ N
and fix any profile θ−i ∈ Θ|N\{i}| of all but agent i. By taking any two types θi and θ′i
for agent i and applying the two implementation inequalities (1) Ui(σ˜(θ), τi(θ);θi) ≥
Ui(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i), τi(θ
′
i ,θ−i);θi) and (2) Ui(σ˜(θ), τi(θ);θ
′
i) ≤ Ui(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i), τi(θ′i ,θ−i);θ′i). In
general, from inequalities (1) and (2) we get
(8) [Si(σ˜(θ′i ,θi))− Si(σ˜(θ))]θi ≥ τi(θ′i ,θ−i)− τi(θ) ≥ [Si(σ˜(θ′i ,θi))− Si(σ˜(θ))]θ′i .
Ifθi andθ′i are such that σ˜(θ) = σ˜(θ
′
i ,θ−i), then Si(σ˜(θ
′
i ,θi)) = Si(σ˜(θ)) and inequal-
ity (8) gives τi(θ) = τi(θ′i ,θ−i).
Let θ(1) ≥ θ(2) ≥ . . . ≥ θ(n−1) be the decreasing order of the waiting cost for the
fixed profile θ−i. Consider any pair (θt+1i ,θ
t
i ) ∈ [θ(t+1),θ(t)]× [θ(t),θ(t−1)]. Using the
just sequencing rule σ˜ and applying the implementability condition (8) when the actual
profile is (θt+1i ,θ−i) ((θ
t
i ,θ−i)) and the misreport of agent i is θ
t
i (θ
t+1
i ) we get
(9) θt+1i s(t) ≤ τi(θt+1i ,θ−i)− τi(θti ,θ−i) ≤ θti s(t).
Since (9) must hold for all (θt+1i ,θ
t
i ) ∈ [θ(t+1)i ,θ(t)i ]× [θ(t)i ,θ(t−1)i ], it follows that
(10) τi(θt+1i ,θ−i)− τi(θti ,θ−i) = θ(t)s(t).
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Condition (10) must hold for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. By setting τi(θni ,θ−i) = hi(θ−i)
for any θni ∈ (0,θ(n−1)) and then solving condition (10) recursively we get the rVCG
transfers (7).
For the converse consider any agent i ∈ N and any profileθ−i. Letθi be the true wait-
ing cost of i and Bi(θ′i ;θi) := Ui(σ˜(θ
′
i ,θ−i), τi(θ
′
i ,θ−i);θi)−Ui(σ˜(θi,θ−i), τi(θi,θ−i);θi)
be the benefit of agent i from a misreport θ′i .
(D1) If θ′i > θi and Pi(σ˜(θi,θ−i)) \ Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i)) 6= ∅, then from the just sequencing
rule we getθ j ≥ θi for all j ∈ Pi(σ˜(θi,θ−i)) \ Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i)). Therefore, using any
rVCG transfer we get Bi(θ′i ;θi) = ∑ j∈Pi(σ˜(θi ,θ−i))\Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i))(θi −θ j)s j ≤ 0.
(D2) If θ′i < θi and Pi(σ˜(θ
′
i ,θ−i)) \ Pi(σ˜(θi,θ−i)) 6= ∅, then from the just sequencing
rule we get θ j ≤ θi for all j ∈ Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i)) \ Pi(σ˜(θi,θ−i)). Hence using any
rVCG transfer we get Bi(θ′i ;θi) = ∑ j∈Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i))\Pi(σ˜(θi ,θ−i))(θ j −θi)s j ≤ 0.
(D3) Finally, if θ′i 6= θi and Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i)) = Pi(σ˜(θi,θ−i)), then Bi(θ′i ;θi) = 0.
Therefore, cases (D1)-(D3) show that agent i cannot benefit from any deviation. Since
the selection of agent i was arbitrary, the result follows. 
4. PROPERTIES OF THE JUST SEQUENCING RULE
In this section we focus on three nice properties of the just sequencing rule.
4.1. The just sequencing rule as an affine cost minimizer. Roberts [31] defined affine
maximizer allocation rules in a general mechanism design framework with quasi-
linear preferences. However, sequencing problems are cost problems and hence the
appropriate adoption of affine maximizer allocation rule of Roberts to the sequencing
problem is the ‘affine cost minimizer sequencing rules’.
Definition 7. A sequencing rule σw,κ : Θn → Σ(N) is an affine cost minimizer if for each
θ ∈ Θn,σw,κ(θ) ∈ arg minσ∈Σ(N)
{
κ(σ) + ∑ j∈N w jθ jS j(σ)
}
, where w j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ N
with at least one w j > 0 and the function κ : Σ(N)→ R is arbitrary.
The affine maximizer sequencing rule σ1,0 with κ(σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ(N) and
w j = 1 for all j ∈ N gives the outcome efficient sequencing rule, that is σ1,0 = σ∗.10 Thus,
the outcome efficient sequencing rule is a affine cost minimizer.
Proposition 1. The just sequencing rule σ˜ is an affine cost maximizer.
10The equality σ1,0 = σ∗ is with the implicit assumption that the tie-breaking rule followed to obtain
σ1,0 is identical to the tie-breaking rule of σ∗.
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Proof: To prove that the just sequencing rule is a affine cost minimizer, we show that
the affine cost minimizer sequencing rule σw
∗ ,0 with κ(σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ(N) and
w∗j = 1/(∏r 6= j sr) > 0 for all j ∈ N coincides with the just sequencing rule σ˜ .
Consider any profile θ ∈ Θn and any two agents i, j ∈ N with θi ≥ θ j. Consider any
orderσ such that k = σ j = σi + 1 for any given k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. Given our objective
is to minimize ∑ j∈N w∗jθ jS j(σ), the sum of weighted completion costs of i and j for σ
is
(11)
Ci j(σ) := w∗i θiSi(σ) + w
∗
jθ jS j(σ) = θi
( si + ∑k∈Pi(σ) sk
∏r 6=i sr
)
+θ j
(
si + s j + ∑k∈Pi(σ) sk
∏r 6= j sr
)
.
Consider the order σ ′ obtained from σ by interchanging the positions of i and j only,
that is σ ′j = σi , σ
′
i = σ j and σ
′
k = σk for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}. The sum of weighted
completion costs of i and j for σ ′ is
(12)
Ci j(σ ′) := w∗i θiSi(σ
′) + w∗jθ jS j(σ
′) = θi
( si + s j ∑k∈Pi(σ) sk
∏r 6=i sr
)
+θ j
(
s j + ∑k∈Pi(σ) sk
∏r 6= j sr
)
.
By taking the difference Ci j(σ ′)−Ci j(σ) and using conditions (11) and (12) and making
some obvious simplifications we get
(13) Ci j(σ ′)− Ci j(σ) = (θi −θ j)
(
1
∏r∈N\{i, j} sr
)
≥ 0.
In condition (13), the inequality is strict if θi > θ j. Condition (13) shows that if
θi ≥ θ j, then for any two consecutive positions in an order it is not more costly
to serve agents i before agent j and if θi > θ j, then it is less costly to serve agent
i before agent j. Notice that for this conclusion we neither required the profile of
waiting costs of the agents N \ {i, j} nor did we require the positions of the agent
N \ {i, j} in the order. Hence, if for any profile θ ∈ Θn, our objective is to select
σw
∗ ,0(θ) ∈ arg minσ∈Σ(N)
{
∑ j∈N w∗jθ jS j(σ)
}
, then σw
∗ ,0(θ) must follow the following
property: (Aff) For any i, j ∈ N such that θi ≥ θ j, σw
∗ ,0
i (θ) ≤ σw
∗ ,0
j (θ). Moreover, since
N \ {i, j} did not matter in condition (13), the converse is also true, that is, given any
profileθ, condition (Aff) givesσw
∗ ,0(θ) ∈ arg minσ∈Σ(N)
{
∑ j∈N w∗jθ jS j(σ)
}
. Given the
tie breaking rule, the order obtained by following condition (Aff) is the same as the
order obtained from the just sequencing rule σ˜ . Hence the result follows. 
Remark 2. In general, for any affine cost minimizer sequencing ruleσw,κ¯ with the prop-
erty that κ(σ) = κ¯ for all σ ∈ Σ(N), urgency index can be replaced by weighted
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urgency index uwi = (wiθi)/si to determine the profile contingent order of serving
the agents. Specifically, like Smith’s [32] rule for outcome efficiency, for these affine
cost minimizers σw,κ¯, σw,κ¯(θ) affine cost minimizes {κ¯ + ∑ j∈N w jθ jS j(σ)} if and only
if the selected order σw,κ¯(θ) satisfies condition (ACM): For any i, j ∈ N, (wiθi)/si ≥
(w jθ j)/s j ⇔ σw,κ¯i (θ) ≤ σw,κ¯j (θ).11 More importantly, the affine cost minimizer se-
quencing rule σw
∗ ,0 that gives the just sequencing rule σ˜ has w∗j = (1/∏k∈N\{ j} sk) as
the agent specific weights and hence weighted urgency index is uw
∗
i = (θi/∏k∈N sk).
Therefore, for any θ ∈ Θn and any i, j ∈ N, uw∗i ≥ uw
∗
j if and only if θi ≥ θ j. That
is, for the affine cost minimizer sequencing rule σw
∗ ,0 that gives σ˜ , comparison of
weighted urgency index across agents reduces to the comparison of the waiting costs
across agents.
4.2. Budget balanced implementability of the just sequencing rule. For implemen-
tation of outcome efficient allocation rules, Zhou [37] provided examples of both public
and private good allocation problems for which no budget balancing VCG mechanisms
exists and for which all VCG mechanisms are inferior to other ‘reasonable’ non-VCG
mechanisms. Zhou [37] concluded that unless one can find a budget balancing VCG
mechanism, one should limit its use. Implementation of outcome efficient rules with
balanced transfers is difficult to get in many economic environments (see, for example,
Hurwicz and Walker [17] and Walker [36]). That implementation of outcome efficiency
is possible with balanced transfers for sequencing and queueing problems was estab-
lished by Mitra [24], [25] and Suijs [33]. Mitra and Sen [26] characterized domains in
a heterogenous objects model with private values where an outcome efficient rule can
be implemented in dominant strategies with balanced transfers. They show that these
domains are non-trivial and are ‘closely’ related to incentive problems in sequencing
and queueing problems studied in Mitra [24], [25] and Suijs [33]. We prove that for
sequencing problems, if we replace outcome efficient sequencing rule with the just se-
quencing rule, we get implementability with balanced transfers provided there are at
least three agents.
Definition 8. A sequencing rule σ is implementable with balanced transfers if the mech-
anism (σ , τ) that implements it has a budget balanced transfer, that is, for all θ ∈ Θn,
∑ j∈N τ j(θ) = 0.
Proposition 2. For any sequencing problem Ω(s1 ,s2)N={1,2} with two agents, implementa-
tion of the just sequencing rule σ˜ with balanced transfers is not possible.
11Given the tie-breaking rule, this profile contingent selection σw,κ(θ) is unique.
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Proof: Fix any processing time vector (s1, s2) and consider the sequencing problem
ΩsN={1,2}. To implement the refined sequencing rule it is necessary that the mechanism
(σ , τ) is an rVCG mechanism (Theorem 2). Pick any rVCG mechanism. Consider the
waiting costs θ1,θ′1,θ2,θ′2 such that θ1 > θ′2 > θ′1 > θ2 and θ′1s1 6= θ′2s2. Budget
balance for the profile (θ1,θ2) gives (B1) h1(θ2) + h2(θ1)−θ2s2 = 0. Budget balance
for (θ1,θ′2) gives (B2) h1(θ′2) + h2(θ1)−θ′2s2 = 0. Budget balance for (θ′1,θ2) gives (B3)
h1(θ2) + h2(θ′1) − θ2s2 = 0. Finally, budget balance for the profile (θ′1,θ′2) gives (B4)
h1(θ′2) + h2(θ′1)−θ′1s1 = 0. By adding (B1) and (B4) and subtracting both (B2) and (B3)
from it we get θ′2s2 −θ′1s1 = 0 which contradicts the restriction that θ′1s1 6= θ′2s2. 
Definition 9. Consider any ΩsN with at least three agents. A mechanism (σ˜ , τ˜
∗) is a
balanced rVCG mechanism if the transfer rule is such that for all θ ∈ Θn and all i ∈ N,
(14)
τ˜∗i (θ) =

∑
j∈N\{i}
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i) if P′i (σ˜(θ)) = ∅,
− ∑
j∈N\{i}
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i) if Pi(σ˜(θ)) = ∅,
∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θ))
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j − ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θ))
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i) otherwise.
where gi : Θ|N\{i}| → R for each i ∈ N is such that for any θ ∈ Θn, ∑i∈N gi(θ−i) = 0.
The balanced rVCG transfer requires that for any profileθ ∈ Θn and given any agent
specific constant transfer gi(θ−i) to agent i, each agent i, in addition, receives as reward
a position specific weighted sum of the minimum cost of all agents served before him
(∑ j∈Pi(σ˜(θ))[(σ˜ j(θ)− 1)/(n− 2)]θ js j) under the refined Ralwsian sequencing order σ˜(θ)
(provided Pi(σ˜(θ)) 6= ∅) and agent i also pays a position specific weighted sum of the
minimum cost of all agents served after him (∑ j∈P′i (σ˜(θ))[(n−σ˜ j(θ))/(n− 2)]θ js j) under
the refined Ralwsian sequencing order σ˜(θ) (provided P′i (σ˜(θ)) 6= ∅). In addition, the
balanced rVCG mechanism also requires that selection of the function gi : Θ|N\{i}| → R
for each agent i ∈ N must be such that for any θ ∈ Θn, ∑ j∈N g j(θ− j) = 0.
Theorem 3. Let ΩsN be a sequencing problem with at least three agents. The just se-
quencing rule is implementable with balanced transfers if and only if the mechanism
(σ˜ , τ) that implements it is a balanced rVCG mechanism.
Proof: We know that the just sequencing rule is implementable if and only if the mech-
anism is an rVCG mechanism (Theorem 2). Therefore, identifying the complete class of
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mechanisms that implements the just sequencing rule with balanced transfers reduces
to identifying the complete class of balanced rVCG mechanisms.
Suppose there is the refined Ralwsian order σ˜(θ) for the profile θ ∈ Θn and agent
i leaves. We define the “induced” order σ˜(θ−i) (of length |N \ {i}|) for the agents in
N \ {i} as follows:
(15) σ˜ j(θ−i) =
{
σ˜ j(θ)− 1 if j ∈ P′i (σ˜(θ)),
σ˜ j(θ) if j ∈ Pi(σ˜(θ)).
In words, σ˜(θ−i) is the order formed by removing agent i and moving all agents behind
him up by one position. Given the same tie-breaking rule for the economy with N \ {i}
agents, it is easy to see that σ˜(θ−i) is also just in N \ {i} for the profile θ−i if σ˜(θ) is just
for the profile θ.
Given that the sequencing problem ΩsN has at least three agents, without loss of
generality, we redefine the rVCG mechanisms by setting for each agent i ∈ N and each
profile θ−i,
(16) hi(θ−i) = ∑
j∈N\{i}
(
σ˜ j(θ−i)− 1
n− 2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i),
where gi : Θ|N\{i}| → R is arbitrary. By substituting (16) in the rVCG transfer (7) we
get the following for any i ∈ N and any θ ∈ Θn.
(A) If P′i (σ˜(θ)) = ∅, then σ˜ j(θ−i) = σ˜ j(θ) for all j ∈ N \ {i} and from (7) we get
τ˜i(θ) = hi(θ−i) = ∑ j∈N\{i}
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i).
(B) If Pi(σ˜(θ)) = ∅, then σ˜ j(θ−i) = σ˜ j(θ)− 1 for all j ∈ N \ {i} and from (7) we get
τ˜i(θ) = −∑ j∈N\{i}θ js j + hi(θ−i) = −∑ j∈N\{i}θ js j + ∑ j∈N\{i}
(
σ˜ j(θ)−2
n−2
)
θ js j +
gi(θ−i) = −∑ j∈N\{i}
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i).
(C) If P′i (σ˜(θ)) 6= ∅ and Pi(σ˜(θ)) 6= ∅, then σ˜ j(θ−i) = σ˜ j(θ) for all j ∈ Pi(σ˜(θ)) 6= ∅,
σ˜ j(θ−i) = σ˜ j(θ)− 1 for all j ∈ P′i (σ˜(θ)) 6= ∅ and from (7) we get
τ˜i(θ) = − ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θ))
θ js j + hi(θ−i)
= − ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θ))
θ js j + ∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θ))
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j + ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θ))
(
σ˜ j(θ)−2
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i)
= ∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θ))
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j − ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θ))
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i).
Conditions (A)-(C) show that when the sequencing problem ΩsN has at least three
agents, then an equivalent representation of the rVCG transfers is that for any i ∈ N
and any θ ∈ Θn,
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(17)
τ˜ ′i (θ) =

∑
j∈N\{i}
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i) if P′i (σ˜(θ)) = ∅,
− ∑
j∈N\{i}
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i) if Pi(σ˜(θ)) = ∅,
∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θ))
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j − ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θ))
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)
θ js j + gi(θ−i) otherwise,
where for each i ∈ N, the function gi : Θ|N\{i}| → R is arbitrary. By taking the repre-
sentation (17) of the rVCG transfer we get for any θ ∈ Θn,
∑
k∈N
τ˜ ′k(θ) = ∑
k∈N
{
∑
j∈Pk(σ˜(θ))
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j − ∑
j∈P′k(σ˜(θ))
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)
θ js j
}
+ ∑
k∈N
gk(θ−k)
= ∑
k∈N
∑
j∈Pk(σ˜(θ))
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)
θ js j − ∑
k∈N
∑
j∈P′k(σ˜(θ))
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)
θ js j + ∑
k∈N
gk(θ−k)
= ∑
j∈N
{
|P′j(σ˜ j(θ))|
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)}
θ js j − ∑
j∈N
{
|Pj(σ˜ j(θ))|
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)}
θ js j + ∑
k∈N
gk(θ−k)
= ∑
j∈N
{
(n− σ˜ j(θ))
(
σ˜ j(θ)−1
n−2
)}
θ js j − ∑
j∈N
{
(σ˜ j(θ)− 1)
(
n−σ˜ j(θ)
n−2
)}
θ js j + ∑
k∈N
gk(θ−k)
= ∑
k∈N
gk(θ−k).
Therefore, by taking the representation (17) of the rVCG transfer we have proved
that for any θ ∈ Θn, ∑
k∈N
τ˜ ′k(θ) = ∑
k∈N
gk(θ−k). Therefore, an rVCG mechanism repre-
sented by (17) is budget balanced if and only if (I) for all θ ∈ Θn, ∑
k∈N
gk(θ−k) = 0.
From the representation (17) of the rVCG transfers and from condition (I), the result
follows. 
Remark 3. There are papers that show that for the family of sequencing problems ΩsN
with three or more agents we can find budget balanced VCG mechanisms and hence
implementation with balanced transfer is also possible with the outcome efficient se-
quencing rule (see Mitra [25] and Suijs [33]). From Remark 1 it follows that for the
queueing problem Ωs
∗
N , the set of all balanced rVCG mechanism coincides with the set
of all VCG mechanisms that first best implements the outcome efficient sequencing
rule.
4.3. Two-dimensional incentives and the just sequencing rule. If we assume that
both waiting cost and the processing time are agent specific private information, then
we have the mechanism design problem for the general sequencing problem ΩN =
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(Θn, S). Specifically, we have an interdependent value situation and therefore the cor-
rect notion is ex-post implementability. The type of any agent i ∈ N is mi = (θi, si) ∈
Θ × R++ that constitutes of his waiting cost as well as his processing time. A pro-
file is m = (m1, . . . , mn) ∈ Θn × S . For any i ∈ N, let m−i, denote the profile
(m1, . . . , mi−1, mi+1, . . . , mn) ∈ Θ|N\{i}| × R|N\{i}|++ which is obtained from the profile
m by eliminating i’s type. For the general sequencing problem ΩN, a (direct reve-
lation) mechanism is (σ g, τ) that constitutes of a general sequencing rule σ g and a
transfer rule τ . A general sequencing rule is a function σ g : Θn × S → Σ(N) that spec-
ifies for each profile m ∈ Θn × S , a unique order σ g(m) = (σ g1 (m), . . . ,σ gn(m)) ∈
Σ(N). A transfer rule is a function τ : Θn × S → Rn that specifies for each profile
m ∈ Θn × S a transfer vector τ(m) = (τ1(m), . . . , τn(m)) ∈ Rn. Specifically, for
ΩN and given any mechanism (σ g, τ), if m′i is the announced type of agent i when
his true type is mi and m−i is the true profile for agents N \ {i}, then the utility of i
is given by vi(σ g(m′i, m−i), τi(m
′
i, m−i); mi; s−i(m−i)) = −θi
(
si + ∑ j∈Pi(σg(m′i ,m−i)) s j
)
+
τi(m′i, m−i).
Definition 10. A mechanism (σ g, τ) ex-post implements the general sequencing rule σ g
if the transfer rule τ : Θn × S → Rn is such that for any i ∈ N, any mi, m′i and any true
profile m−i,
(18) vi(σ g(m), τi(m); mi; s−i(m−i)) ≥ vi(σ g(m′i, m−i), τi(m′i, m−i); mi; s−i(m−i)).
Ex-post implementability requires truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium for any agent
and for every true type profile m.
Definition 11. A mechanism (σ g, τ) ex-post implements with balanced transfers the gen-
eral sequencing rule σ g if the transfer rule τ : Θn × S → Rn satisfies ex-post imple-
mentability condition (18) and is also budget balanced, that is for all m ∈ Θn×S → Rn,
∑ j∈N t j(m) = 0.
Definition 12. A general sequencing rule σ˜ g is just if for each profile m ∈ Θn × S , the
chosen order σ˜ g(m) satisfies the following property: for any i, j ∈ N such that θi ≥ θ j,
σ˜
g
i (m) ≤ σ˜ gj (m).12
For any true m = (m1 = (θ1, s1), . . . , mn = (θn, sn)) we say θ is obtained from m if
it is a collection of the first element from m j = (θ j, s j) for each j ∈ N and we say
s is obtained from m if it is a collection of the second element from m j = (θ j, s j) for
each j ∈ N. Similarly, for any i ∈ N and any true m−i = (m1 = (θ1, s1), . . . , mi−1 =
12The tie-breaking rule guarantees state contingent uniqueness of σ˜g.
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(θi−1, si−1), mi+1 = (θi+1, si+1), . . . , mn = (θn, sn)) we say θ−i is obtained from m−i if
it is a collection of the first element from m j = (θ j, s j) for each j ∈ N \ {i} and we say
s−i is obtained from m−i if it is a collection of the second element from m j = (θ j, s j) for
each j ∈ N \ {i}. For ΩN, the just general sequencing rule satisfies the following: For
any m = (m1, . . . , mn) ∈ Θn × S , σ˜ g(m) = σ˜(θ) where θ is obtained from m.
Definition 13. For σ˜ g, a mechanism (σ˜ g, τ˜) is a generalized rVCG mechanism if the trans-
fer rule is such that for all m ∈ Θn × S and all i ∈ N,
(19) τ˜ gi (θi, m−i) =
 h
g
i (m−i) if P
′
i (σ˜(θi,θ−i)) = ∅,
hgi (m−i)− ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θi ,θ−i))
θ js j otherwise.
where θ−i is obtained from m−i and h
g
i : Θ
|N\{i}| ×R|N\{i}|++ → R is arbitrary.
Proposition 3. The just general sequencing rule σ˜ g is ex-post implementable if and
only if the mechanism (σ˜ g, τ) that implements it is a generalized rVCG mechanism.
Proof: We only prove that if the just general sequencing rule σ˜ g is ex-post imple-
mentable via a mechanism (σ˜ g, τ), then the mechanism is a generalized rVCG mecha-
nism. The other part is easy and hence omitted.
Consider any i ∈ N and fix any true type m−i for all agents other than i. For any true
type mi = (θi, si) of i and any misreport m′i = (θ
′
i , s
′
i) by i, ex-post implementabil-
ity of the just general sequencing rule σ˜ g requires vi(σ˜ g(m), τi(m); mi; s−i(m−i)) ≥
vi(σ˜ g(m′i, m−i), τi(m
′
i, m−i); mi; s−i(m−i)) which is the same as requiring
(20)
vi(σ˜(θi,θ−i), τi(mi, m−i); mi; s−i(m−i)) ≥ vi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i), τi(m′i, m−i); mi, s−i(m−i)).
Moreover, given the true type m−i of all agents and given any pair of types (m′i =
(θ′i , s
′
i), m
′′
i = (θ
′
i , s
′′
i )) for i with the property the waiting cost is identical in m
′
i and m
′′
i ,
σ˜ g(m′i, m−i) = σ˜(θ
′
i ,θi) = σ˜
g(m′′i , m−i) since just sequencing rule ignores the process-
ing time. Hence, using ex-post implementability, we get the following inequalities:
(1) −θ′i(s′i + ∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i))
s j) + τi(m′i, m−i) ≥ −θ′i(s′i + ∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i))
s j) + τi(m′′i , m−i).
(2) −θ′i(s′′i + ∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i))
s j)+τi(m′i, m−i) ≤ −θ′i(s′′i + ∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i))
s j)+τi(m′′i , m−i).
Inequality (1) gives τi(m′i, m−i) ≥ τi(m′′i , m−i) and inequality (2) gives τi(m′i, m−i) ≤
τi(m′′i , m−i) and therefore, τi(m
′
i, m−i) = τi(m
′′
i , m−i). Hence we have
(21) τi(m′i, m−i) = τi(m
′′
i , m−i) := τi(θ
′
i , m−i).
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Using (21) in (20) we get
(22) vi(σ˜(θi,θ−i), τi(θi, m−i); mi; s−i(m−i)) ≥ vi(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i), τi(θ′i , m−i); mi, s−i(m−i)).
As long as the true type m−i of agents N \ {i} is known, the processing time of these
agents s−i obtained from m−i is known and θ−i obtained from m−i is also known and
hence the waiting cost cut-off vector (θµ(1), . . . ,θµ(R)) for agent i with the just sequenc-
ing rule σ˜ is also known and the calculation of the transfer for agent i is independent
of the processing time of agent i. Therefore, from inequality (22) we get that for any
given si > 0, the following inequality must be true.
(23) Ui(σ˜(θi,θ−i), τi(θi, m−i);θi) ≥ Ui(σ˜(θ′i ,θ−i), τi(θ′i , m−i);θi).
Note that if inequality (23) holds for some given si > 0 and for all θi ∈ Θ, then for
any other s′i > 0 with the same transfer, inequality (23) holds for any θi ∈ Θ since si
(either actual or misreported) does not enter the calculation of the transfer τi(θi, m−i).
The true processing time si only enters in the calculation of the completion time Si(σ˜).
Inequality (23) is similar to the implementability inequality (1) with τi(θi,θ−i) of
inequality (1) replaced by τi(θi, m−i) in (23) where θ−i is the waiting cost vector ob-
tained from m−i. Moreover, the waiting cost cut-off vector (θµ(1), . . . ,θµ(R)) for the
just sequencing rule is same for both m−i and θ−i when θ−i is obtained from m−i.
Hence for any true m−i, true θ−i obtained from m−i and any θi,θ′i ∈ Θ, we must have
(B) τi(θi,θ−i)− τi(θ′i ,θ−i) = τi(θi, m−i)− τi(θ′i , m−i). From (B) it follows that for any
θi ∈ Θ, any true m−i andθ−i obtained from m−i, (C) τi(θi, m−i)−τi(θi,θ−i) := gi(m−i).
Recall that implementability of the just sequencing rule σ˜ requires that the transfer
must be an rVCG transfer, that is for any θ−i, and any θi ∈ Θ, the transfer τi(θi,θ−i) in
(C) must be equal to the rVCG transfer τ˜i(θi,θ−i) given by (7). Hence from (C) we get
(24) τi(θi, m−i) =
 hi(θ−i) + gi(m−i) if P
′
i (σ˜(θi,θ−i)) = ∅,
hi(θ−i) + gi(m−i)− ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θi ,θ−i))
θ js j otherwise.
where the functions hi : Θ|N\{i}| → R and gi : Θ|N\{i}| × R|N\{i}|++ → R are arbi-
trary. Without loss of generality, by setting hi(θ−i) + gi(m−i) = h
g
i (m−i) in (24) we
get τi(θi, m−i) := τ˜
g
i (θi, m−i) and the result follows. 
That ex-post implementable with balanced transfers is not possible forΩN={1,2}with
two agents is a natural extension of the arguments in Proposition 2. By applying ar-
guments similar to that in Theorem 3, it is easy to see that the just general sequencing
rule σ˜ g is ex-post implementable with balanced transfers.
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Definition 14. Consider the general sequencing problemΩN with at least three agents.
For σ˜ g, a mechanism (σ˜ g, τ˜ g∗) is a balanced generalized rVCG mechanism if the transfer
rule is such that for all m ∈ Θn × S and all i ∈ N,
(25)
τ˜
g∗
i (θi, m−i) =

∑
j∈N\{i}
A j(θi)θ js j + g
g
i (m−i) if P
′
i = ∅,
− ∑
j∈N\{i}
B j(θi)θ js j + g
g
i (m−i) if Pi = ∅,
∑
j∈Pi(σ˜(θi ,θ−i))
A j(θi)θ js j − ∑
j∈P′i (σ˜(θi ,θ−i))
B j(θi)θ js j + g
g
i (m−i) otherwise.
where θ−i is obtained from m−i, A j(θi) := (σ˜ j(θi,θ−i) − 1)/(n − 2), B j(θi) := (n −
σ˜ j(θi,θ−i))/(n− 2) and for any i ∈ N, ggi : Θ|N\{i}| ×R|N\{i}|++ → R is such that for any
m ∈ Θn × S , ∑i∈N ggi (m−i) = 0.
Proposition 4. Let ΩN be the general sequencing problem with at least three agents.
The just general sequencing rule σ˜ g is ex-post implementable with balanced transfers
if and only if the mechanism (σ˜ g, τ) that implements it is a balanced generalized rVCG
mechanism.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that the nice properties of the just sequencing rule from a mecha-
nism design perspective are the following.
(1) It is a Rawlsian sequencing rule which is implementable in dominant strategies.
(2) It is an affine cost minimizer.
(3) Its implementation is costless, that is, it is implementable with balanced trans-
fers.
(4) Unlike outcome efficiency, even when both waiting cost and processing time
are private information it is ex-post implementable with balanced transfers.
The cost of selecting the just sequencing rule is the efficiency loss, that is, the profile
contingent difference in aggregate completion cost between the just sequencing rule
and the outcome efficient sequencing rule. When the processing time of the agents are
non-identical, this loss is positive for profiles where the order under the just sequencing
rule is different from that of the outcome efficient sequencing rule.
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